ALASKA RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11: A
PROPOSED AMENDMENT AND A GUIDE FOR
APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1983 the United States Supreme Court amended Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 11 to impose specific obligations on attorneys and
others who sign pleadings, motions, or other papers filed with a court.I
The advisory committee intended the amended rule to "discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and to streamline the litigation process by lessening frivolous claims or defenses." 2
Although Alaska's Code of Civil Procedure is modelled in part
after the federal rules, 3 Alaska's Rule 11 contains the wording of pre1983 federal Rule 11.4 A rules change advisory committee is currently
considering whether Alaska should adopt amended Rule 11.5 After
the advisory committee prepares a recommendation, the Supreme
and decide whether
Court of Alaska will review the recommendation
6
amended.
as
11
Rule
to reject or adopt
The purpose of this note is twofold: to illustrate the operation of
amended Rule 11,7 and to urge the Alaska Supreme Court to adopt
the federal version of Rule 11. To accomplish this purpose, this note
analyzes recent federal Rule 11 cases. The analysis and criticism of
Copyright © 1986 by Alaska Law Review
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
"Rule 11" refers to the current federal version of the Rule, unless otherwise
indicated.
2. The advisory committee's notes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 provide: "Greater attention by the district courts to pleading and motion abuses and the
imposition of sanctions when appropriate, should discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to streamline the litigation process by lessening frivolous claims or
defenses."
3. Compare ALASKA R. Civ. P. 1-70 with FED. R. Civ. P. 1-70.
4. See infra note 17.
5. The proposed change is being considered pursuant to Alaska's administrative
rulemaking procedure. ALASKA ADMIN. R. 44(h) (amended Sept. 15, 1985).
6. See ALASKA ADMIN. R. 44(h). The court can also refer the proposal to a
committee for further study. Id.
7. The analysis of federal case law will also be of interest to members of the
Alaska bar practicing in federal courts in Alaska. The requirements of Rule 11 apply
as well to members of the Alaska bar serving as local counsel in federal cases in which
papers filed with the court are prepared by foreign counsel. See infra note 26.
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these cases serves as a proposed guide to Alaska courts for the application and interpretation of the proposed amendments to Alaska Rule
11. Alaska then may receive the efficiency benefits of the amendments
while avoiding their potential negative effects on vigorous representation and creative advocacy.
II.
A.

THE AMENDED RULE AND ITS OPERATION

Alaska's Present Rule 11 as a Point of Reference

The operation of Alaska's current Rule 11 isbest illustrated by
the paucity of cases invoking the rule. 8 Indeed, the Supreme Court of
Alaska has discussed Alaska Rule 11 in only one reported case,
Sanuita v. Common Laborer'sand Hod CarriersUnion of America Local 34L 9 In Sanuita, the plaintiff filed an inadvertently unsigned complaint praying for a temporary restraining order to prevent the
defendants from disrupting union hall meetings.10 On appeal, the defendants argued that the plaintiff's failure to sign the complaint deprived the court of jurisdiction."1 The supreme court refused to
consider this contention because the defendants had failed to draw the
trial court's attention to the missing signature and to move to strike
the complaint for failure to comply with Alaska Rule 11.12
Although the supreme court did not apply Alaska Rule 11 in
Sanuita, the court did briefly discuss it in dicta. Chief Justice Nesbett
noted that the requirements of Alaska's Rule 11 were identical to
those of federal Rule 11.13 The court stated that "the overlying purpose of the rule has been to insure the good faith of counsel by holding
them strictly accountable for all allegations contained in the
14
complaint."
The brief discussion of Alaska Rule 11 in Sanuita indicates that
Alaska Rule 11 should be construed in the same manner as the pre8. Prior to the 1983 amendments, there were also relatively few cases invoking
federal Rule 11. See Risinger, Honesty in Pleadingand its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Rule 1L 61 MINN. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (1977) (noting that as of 1976
there had been only twenty-three Rule 11 cases in the federal courts in which one
party had attempted to strike another party's pleading as a "sham"); see also R.
RODES, K. RIPPLE, & C. MOONEY, SANCTIONS IMPOSABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 64 (1981) (Federal Judicial Center) (finding
as of 1981 only two federal cases in which a sanction had actually been imposed under
old Rule 11).
9. 402 P.2d 199 (Alaska 1965).

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 200.
Id.
Id. at 201.
Id. at 200.
Id.
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1983 version of federal Rule 11.15 Under that construction, attorneys

are required to ensure that non-frivolous grounds for an action or defense exist and that the pleading is not interposed for delay. 16 The
trial court has discretion to impose sanctions that include striking the
pleading or, in the case of willful violations, ordering disciplinary

action.
B.

Operational Changes in Federal Rule 11

The Supreme Court's 1983 amendment to Rule 11 entailed a substantial textual modification of the rule. 17 This modification effected
seven fundamental changes in the operation of Rule 11. Federal Rule
11:
(1) explicitly applies to every paper filed in court, not just the
pleadings;
(2) applies to signatures of persons appearing pro se as well as to
attorneys and parties;
15. See id. at 200 nn. 2-3.

16. FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C. (1982); ALASKA R. Civ. P. 11.
17. The following passage contains the changes of amended Rule 11 and the text
of the pre-1983 rule, which is identical to Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The
additions are in italics and the deleted portions of the pre-1983 rule are in brackets.
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name,
whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading, motion, or otherpaperand state his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need
not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two
witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney orparty constitutes a certificate by him
that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief [there is good ground to support it; and
that it is not interposed for delay] formed after reasonableinquiry it is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not
interposedfor any improperpurpose,such as to harassor to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or
other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signedpromptly after
the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant [or is signed

with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule; it may be stricken as sham and
false and the action may proceed as though the pleading had not been
served. For a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to
appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken if scandalous or
indecent matter is inserted]. If a pleading, motion, or otherpaper is signed in
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall
impose upon the person who signed it, a representedparty, or both, an appropriatesanction, which may include an order to pay to the otherparty orparties
the amount of the reasonable expenses incurredbecause of the filing of the
pleading, motion, or otherpaper, including reasonable attorney'sfee.
2A J. MOORE & J. LuCAS § 11.01 (2d ed. 1986).
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(3) mandates a reasonable prefiling inquiry into the facts and the
law on which the paper is based;
(4) specifies that papers filed must be
(a) well grounded in fact, and
(b) warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for
the extension, modification or reversal of existing law;
(5) further specifies that papers may not be filed for any improper
purpose;
(6) directs the court to impose sanctions including reasonable expenses incurred by the opposing party due to the filing, which may
include a reasonable attorney fee; and
(7) allows imposition of sanctions on counsel, client, or both. 18
The Supreme Court adopted these amendments in response to
widespread concern over frivolous litigation and abusive practices by
attorneys. 19 Amended Rule 11 seeks to discourage such abuses by imposing more specific and extensive obligations on those filing any paper in federal court and by subjecting violators to sanctions under the
rule.
The amendments effected two significant changes in Rule 11.
First, the amended rule places great emphasis on a signing attorney's
affirmative duty to conduct a prefiling inquiry into the underlying facts
and law. Second, the court now scrutinizes that inquiry under a
heightened standard. While original Rule 11 required a finding of subjective bad faith in order to impose sanctions on an attorney, 20 current
Rule 11 applies an objective standard. A greater range of circumstances will now trigger a violation of Rule 11. 21 The new standard is
one of reasonableness under the circumstances, and it applies to both
22
the factual and legal prefiling inquiry required by the amended rule.
18. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11 - A Closer Look, 104
F.R.D. 181, 184-85 (1985); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes.
19. FED. R. CIv. P. 11 advisory committee's notes.
20. See, e.g., Suslick v. Rothschild Sec. Corp., 741 F.2d 1000, 1007 (7th Cir.
1984) (although case decided after adoption of 1983 amendment to Rule 11, pre-1983
Rule 11 standard of subjective bad faith applied because complaint which allegedly
violated Rule 11 had been filed prior to the August 1, 1983, effective date of the
amendment); Badillo v. Central Steel and Wire Co., 717 F.2d 1160, 1165 (7th Cir.
1983) (prevailing defendant in Title VII case denied recovery of attorney's fees under
pre-1983 Rule 11 due to lack of any showing of subjective bad faith on the part of
plaintiff's counsel).
21. FED. R. CIv. P. 11 advisory committee's notes; see also S. KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS 6 (1981) (Federal Judicial Center) (noting
that as of February 1985, at least 159 opinions concerning Rule 11 sanctions had been
published and in at least 65 of those cases some portion of attorney's fees had been
awarded).
22. FED. R. CIv. P. 11 advisory committee's notes. The standard of reasonableness is to be applied in the context of the circumstances at the time of the filing and
without the benefit of hindsight. Id.; see Hot Locks, Inc. v. Ooh La La, Inc., 107
F.R.D. 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (although court granted defendant's motion to dismiss
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Hence, a "pure heart, empty head" 2 3 defense will no longer shield an
attorney from sanctions. 24
III. THE ATTORNEY'S AFFIRMATIVE DUTY UNDER
FEDERAL RULE 11

A. Inquiry Into Facts
Current Rule 11 requires that the signing counsel read the pleading, motion, or paper and certify "to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief," formed after a reasonable inquiry, that the filing is
well grounded in fact. In order to satisfy his obligation to make a
reasonable inquiry, an attorney cannot rely on the conclusory statement of his client 25 or another attorney. 26 Instead, he must acquire

patent, trademark, and copyright claims, it held that plaintiff did not violate Rule 11
because when forum was selected plaintiff did not know venue was improper).
23. See In re Ronco, 105 F.R.D. 493, 496-97 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (language
quoted here used to describe lawyer whose subjective good faith insulates him from
sanctions despite his advancement of clearly groundless claims).
24. See Schwarzer, supra note 18, at 186-87; Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of
New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985) ("[S]ubjective good faith no longer provides the safe harbor it once did."); Hearld v. Barnes & Spectrum Emergency Care,
107 F.R.D. 17, 19 (E.D. Tex. 1985). But see Baranski v. Serhant, 106 F.R.D. 247,
249-50 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (mistake defense successful where defendant's counsel conceded that assertion by plaintiff's counsel of claims on behalf of additional plaintiffs in
second and third amended complaints was mistaken).
25. For example, a client's bare statement that "X negligently injured me" will
not suffice. See infra note 27.
26. The advisory committee's notes on Rule 11 state that in determining the reasonableness of the attorney's factual and legal inquiry, one factor to be considered is
whether the attorney "depended on forwarding counsel or another member of the
bar." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes. Despite this language, one
court has construed Rule 11 to impose sanctions upon local counsel signing papers
that were prepared by foreign counsel. See Long v. Quantex Resources, Inc., 108
F.R.D. 416 (1985). In Long the local counsel signed a motion to dismiss, a motion for
a change of venue, and a motion to join a necessary party, but withdrew the motions
at oral argument. Id. at 417-18. The court held that the motions violated Rule 11
because they lacked any form of factual support for the relief requested. Id. at 418.
The court imposed a sanction of $750.00 in attorney's fees on the local counsel because it found that a simple reading of the motions revealed their lack of adequate
factual support necessary to comply with Rule 11. Id.; cf Schwarzer, supra note 18,
at 186 ("The presence of the name of local counsel or his firm on the paper raises an
inference that he has authorized, or at least concurred in its filing. It would be difficult for a lawyer to disclaim all responsibility for a paper bearing his name."); see also
Pravic v. United States Indus. - Clearing, 109 F.R.D. 620 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (in sanctioning defendant's attorney for filing a groundless motion to remove case to federal
court, court held that attorney's reliance on memorandum prepared by former codefendant's counsel did not satisfy requirements of Rule 11 where defendant did no
independent research and cases cited in memorandum did not support removal); but
see Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124, 125 n.1 (1984)
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sufficient knowledge of the facts27 to form a reasonable belief in the
existence of a factual basis for the pleading, motion, or other paper.2 8
The court in Coburn OpticalIndustries,Inc. v. Cilco, Inc., 29 succinctly
stated this standard:
Despite an attorney's belief in the statements of his client, he needs
facts on which to ground knowledge, information or belief. If all
the attorney has is his client's assurance that facts exist or do not
exist, when a reasonable30 inquiry would reveal otherwise, he has not
satisfied his obligation.
In Coburn, the plaintiff had filed a civil action for infringement of
certain glass lens patents. The plaintiff alleged venue under a statute
providing for venue in patent cases in a district "where the defendant
has committed acts of infringement and has a regular place of business."'' a The defendant filed a motion to transfer. In that motion the
defendant admitted that it had a regular place of business in the district, but submitted affidavits denying ever making or using the lenses
in its manufacturing facilities there. 32 Subsequently, the plaintiff deposed employees of the defendant and, after a lengthy investigation,
discovered that a number of the lenses in question were manufactured
("[I]n the absence of an indication of active participation in the preparation or decision to file a paper by local counsel ...it does not seem appropriate to subject them to
sanctions other than criticism for their apparent neglect.").
In light of this split of authority, an Alaska attorney serving as local counsel
before the United States District Court for the District of Alaska should be sure to
review all pleadings, motions, or other papers he signs to ensure that they include the
necessary factual support and, at least in their form, advance legal arguments based on
existing law or a good faith argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. The impossibility of duplicating the preparing counsel's factual and legal
inquiry, however, illustrates the extent to which local counsel must largely depend
upon the preparing counsel to conform to the requirements of Rule 11. Cf
Schwarzer, supra note 18, at 186 ("Rule 11 is not intended to increase the cost of
litigation by requiring review of papers by an additional set of lawyers."). Local counsel can resolve this dilemma by requiring that preparing counsel provide him with a
brief memorandum outlining the factual and legal basis for the paper filed. Although
this measure would entail a slight increase in the cost of preparation, it would benefit
the preparing counsel as well by ensuring compliance with the dictates of Rule 11.
Such a measure would also result in greater judicial efficiency to the extent that it
would encourage attorneys to modify or withhold filings that do not comply with the
dictates of Rule 11.
27. An attorney's knowledge of facts based on conversations with his client or
others must be distinguished from mere conclusory assurances that those facts exist.
The former satisfies the attorney's obligation under Rule 11, but the latter does not.
See Schwarzer, supra note 18, at 187.
28. Id.

29.
30.
31.
32.

610 F. Supp. 656 (M.D.N.C. 1985).
Id. at 659 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 657 n.1 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1982)).
Id. at 657-58.
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in the alleged district. 33 The plaintiff then filed a motion for attorney's
fees pursuant to Rule 11.
In ruling on the plaintiff's Rule 11 motion for attorney's fees and
costs incurred because of the defendant's motion to transfer, the court
held that the defendant and its counsel had failed to make a reasonable
34
inquiry into the facts supporting the motion to transfer venue.
Although the court acknowledged that determining the facts pertinent
to the patent venue issue would have taken "some time," it nevertheless held that this type of prefiling investigation was necessary to meet
imposed by Rule 11 and to prevent the omission of
the obligations
35
critical facts.
Even when the client provides the attorney with facts sufficient to
support the allegations made in the papers filed with the court, Rule
11 may impose a further duty of inquiry on the attorney. If the client
provides factual information that may be verified with a minimum of
additional investigation, the attorney must conduct this "additional"
investigation in order to satisfy the "reasonable inquiry" standard of
Rule 11.
In Van Berkel v. Fox Farm and Road Machinery,36 the plaintiff's
counsel in a personal injury case interviewed his client and the client's
family members at their home. According to the attorney, the plaintiff
informed him that the farm accident that caused the loss of his arm
occurred in September of 1977. Although the plaintiff had contacted
the attorney sometime before 1980, the attorney did not file a product
liability action until September of 1983. 37 The complaint alleged that
the accident had occurred in September of 1977. The accident had, in
fact, occurred during September, 1976.38 By the time plaintiff's coun39
sel filed the complaint, the applicable statute of limitations had run.
The Van Berkel court held that plaintiff's counsel failed to make
the reasonable inquiry into the facts required by Rule 11 and ordered
that the attorney pay the defendant's resulting costs, expenses, and
attorney's fees. 4° The court based its holding on the fact that a simple
check of the client's hospital and medical records would have informed the attorney of the correct date of the accident. 4 1 Because the
33. Id. at 658.
34. Id. at 659.
35. Id.
36. 581 F. Supp. 1248 (D. Minn. 1984).
37. Id. at 1250.
38. The defendant established September 1976 as the actual date of the accident
by reference to hospital records and a newspaper clipping describing the accident. Id.
at 1249-50.
39. Id. at 1249.
40. Id. at 1251.
41. Id. at 1250.
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client had come to the attorney over three years prior to the filing of
the complaint, the court found that the attorney had more than
enough time to obtain and examine the medical records and to make
any additional inquiry needed to verify the actual date of the
accident. 42
As the above discussion illustrates, the attorneys in Coburn and
Van Berkel could not rely on information acquired from their clients.
In Kamen v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co.,43 however, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that an
attorney is justified in relying upon information provided by his client
when the relevant information is in the hands of the opposing party. 44
The Kamen court reversed an order by the district court imposing
Rule 11 sanctions on the plaintiff's attorney. 45 The sanctions had
been based in part on the attorney's failure to conduct a reasonable
factual inquiry into whether the defendant received federal financial
assistance, a fact that would determine the applicability of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.46 The court held that the attorney's reliance on
the factual information supplied by his client in this regard was "reasonable" within the meaning of Rule 11 because that information "was
largely in the control of the defendants" and consequently "could
hardly be known to an outsider. ' 47
The holding in Kamen is consistent with the caveat contained in
the advisory committee's notes on Rule 11:
[W]hat constitutes a reasonable inquiry may depend on such factors
as how much time for investigation was available to the signer [or]
whether he had to rely on a client for information as to the facts
underlying the pleading, motion or other paper ....48
Although the advisory committee's notes do not give further examples, this principle would presumably also apply to a situation in
which a client consults an attorney only a few days before a pleading
must be filed in order to prevent the loss of a right or remedy - such
as where the statute of limitations is about to run. In such a situation,
the attorney's reliance on facts provided by the client would probably
be reasonable. 4 9 The attorney may, however, have a duty to amend or
42. Id.

43. 791 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1986).
44. Id. at 1012.
45. Id. at 1014.
46. Id. at 1008.
47. Id. at 1012.

48.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes.

49. See Parness, Groundless Pleadings and Certifying Attorneys in the Federal
Courts, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 325, 338.
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withdraw the paper if he subsequently learns that the facts are incon50
sistent with the pleading.
B.

Inquiry Into Law

Rule 11 requires that an attorney have a "reasonable basis" for
the view of the law advanced in his pleading, motion, or paper.51 This
standard is objective and does not involve an inquiry into the attorney's subjective belief.5 2 Instead, the court must assess the merits of
the legal argument advanced by the party and objectively assess
whether it is "warranted by existing law or a good faith ' argument
for
53
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law."
In Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Service, Inc.,5 4 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit applied the objective standard of Rule 11 to affirm sanctions the district court had imposed on
an attorney for filing a complaint premised on inaccurate legal arguments and assertions of controlling precedent.5 5 The plaintiff had been
arrested on a charge of vandalism. Claiming that the procedures of his
arrest violated his civil rights, the plaintiff filed a complaint under federal civil rights statutes.5 6 The district court dismissed the complaint
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted 57 and
imposed sanctions under Rule 11.58 The complaint contained several

patently erroneous interpretations of federal civil rights statutes,5 9 and
50. See also Schwarzer, supra note 18, at 189. Schwarzer states:
[A] belief reasonable when a paper was filed may become unreasonable in
light of subsequent developments. Thus, a claim that may be properly asserted and a defense that may be properly maintained when first filed could
be rendered untenable by later discovery disclosures. To persist in claims or
defenses beyond a point where they could no longer be considered wellgrounded in fact may violate the rule.
Id.; but see Kamen v. American Tel. & Tel., 791 F.2d 1006, 1010 (2d Cir. 1986). In
Kamen, the court did not express a view on whether sanctions might be imposed
under Rule 11 for an attorney's failure to correct a "pleading, motion or other paper"
which he reasonably believed at the time of signing to be in compliance but which,
from information acquired at a later date, he could no longer reasonably view as well
grounded in fact or law.
51. SFM Corp. v. Sundstrand Corp., 102 F.R.D. 555, 557 (N.D. Ill. 1984); see
Wells v. Oppenheimer & Co., 101 F.R.D. 358, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), vacated, 106
F.R.D. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
52. SFM Corp., 102 F.R.D. at 557.
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
54. 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985).
55. Id. at 205.
56. Id. at 198, 202-03.
57. Id. at 197.
58. Id. at 205. ("[Ihe court below imposed sanctions of only $858.43, one-third
of the attorney's fees and costs incurred by the defendants, thereby crediting the possible merit of some of Rodgers's claims.") (citation omitted).
59. Id. at 198-99, 201-03.
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included the following claims: a claim that a ten hour delay between
the plaintiff's arrest and his opportunity to post bond caused by the
negligent failure of the police to complete booking procedures in a
timely manner violated his substantive right to liberty; 60 a claim that
the city of Chicago violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights
through the use of an established policy of making threatening phone
calls to suspects; 6 1 and a claim that the defendants' conduct consti-

tuted class-based invidious discrimination prohibited by section 1985

of Title 28 of the United States Code. 62 The court imposed sanctions
because the. attorney had "refused to recognize or to grapple with the
established law of the Supreme Court and of this Circuit that defeats
'63
several of the claims at issue."

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

Circuit reached a similar conclusion in ruling on a discovery dispute in
the highly publicized libel case of Westmoreland v. CBS.64 In that
case, counsel for the defendant filed a motion requesting that the court
hold a non-party deponent 65 in civil contempt for refusing to allow his
deposition to be videotaped.6 6 Defendant's counsel made this motion
despite the lack of either a prior order of the court or a stipulation in
writing that depositions would be videotaped as required by Federal
60. Id. at 198-99. The court pointed out that the situation as presented did not
provide a basis for a claim under section 1983. The court explained that when random negligent actions by state officials deprive an individual of his right to procedural
due process, the availability of state tort remedies for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution provide sufficient protection, and recovery under section 1983 is
thus precluded. Id. at 199. In asserting that section 1983 should apply, the attorney
did not even attempt to construct an argument explaining why clear authority to the
contrary in that circuit should not apply. Id. at 205.
61. Id. at 201-02. The court noted the Supreme Court's recent reiteration that
proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability unless it includes proof that the incident was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy. Id. The complaint failed to allege a single fact which would
indicate problems, systemic in nature, concerning the treatment of arrestees. Id. at
202.
62. Id. at 202-03. The court rejected the claim that the plaintiff belonged to "a
class consisting of those individuals who park cars on Chicago's north side that are
towed without cause by Lincoln Towing and whom Lincoln Towing decides to intimidate and harass." Id. at 203. The court discussed the Supreme Court's recent refusal
"to extend the protection of Section 1985 to commercial and economic animus," and
cited Seventh Circuit precedent rejecting section 1985 claims when the "class" of victims depends entirely on the defendant's actions and such class does not therefore
exist until after the defendant's act. Id. at 203.
63. Id. at 205.
64. 770 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The merits of the main litigation were not
relevant to this appeal, which involved a pretrial discovery dispute. Id. at 1170 n.2.
65. Richard Helms, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency from 1966-1973.
Id. at 1170-71.
66. Id. at 1176.
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Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(4). 67 The court held that the defendant's contempt motion had no reasonable basis in law or fact. 68
Although the defendant sought to justify its motion by noting several
factors that allegedly militated strongly in favor of ordering a videotaped deposition, the court held that they were "absolutely irrelevant"
to the issue of civil contempt. 69 In reaching this conclusion, the court
made a sharp distinction between the issue of whether the district
court should have granted a Rule 30(b)(4) motion - a motion that
was never made - and the question of whether the civil contempt
motion had a reasonable basis in fact and law. 70 Finally, the court
reversed the district court's refusal to impose Rule 11 sanctions and
imposing judicial
noted that this situation "illustrates the need'7 for
1
sanctions against groundless litigation tactics.
In addition to requiring that a signing attorney or party adequately address controlling precedent and comply with applicable procedural rules, 72 Rule 11 imposes on the signer an obligation "to satisfy
himself that the court at least arguably has jurisdiction and that the
action is not otherwise barred."' 73 In Heuttig & Schromm, Inc. v.
Landscape Contractors Council,74 an employer filed a complaint
against the employer's negotiating council and a local union. The
court held that the complaint failed to set forth a substantial federal
67. Id. at 1171. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(4) stands for the proposition that absent a written agreement or court order a party has no right to require
deponents to submit to videotaping. See ALASKA R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4) (providing that
the "court may upon motion order that the testimony at a deposition be recorded by
other than stenographic means"); ALASKA R. Civ. P. 29 (providing that, unless otherwise ordered by the court, the parties may stipulate that depositions be taken "in any
manner").
68. Westmoreland, 770 F.2d at 1177.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1177-78.
71. Id. at 1180.
72. Alaska courts currently have power to sanction attorneys or parties for failure
to comply with the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 95 provides in pertinent
part: "For any infraction of these rules, the court may withhold or assess costs or
attorney's fees as the circumstances of the case and discouragement of like conduct in
the future may require .... ." Alaska Rule 95, however, has only been applied to
violations of local court rules and Alaska disciplinary rules. See Tobey v. Superior
Court, 680 P.2d 782 (Alaska 1984) (attorney fined for failure to file documents required under court order); Davis v. Superior Court, 580 P.2d 1176 (Alaska 1978)
(district attorney fined for appearing at hearing unprepared to answer factual questions relevant to disposition of motion); Cook v. Aurora Motors, Inc., 503 P.2d 1046
(Alaska 1972) (case remanded to trial court to determine whether attorney should be
sanctioned for noncompliance with local rule governing requirements of a notice of
appeal).
73. Schwarzer, supra note 18, at 190.
74. 582 F. Supp. 1519 (N.D. Cal. 1984), aff'd, 790 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1986).
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claim, 75 was clearly barred by collateral estoppel, 76 and was patently
without merit.77 The court also held that the complaint did not allege

an independent basis for jurisdiction over claims against a pendent

party.78 Concluding that the pleading was not warranted by existing
law or a good faith argument for extension or modification of existing
law, the court bluntly stated, "[T]he fact is that counsel knew or
should have known that, at least in the matter of Local 3, their client
had neither a cause of action nor any claim to invoke this Court's
' '79
jurisdiction.
Just as a party who files a complaint must assess whether the
court has jurisdiction and whether the action is barred, a party moving

for summary judgment must have a reasonable basis in law for the
motion. In SFM Corp. v. Sundstrand Corp.,80 the court held that the

plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in a case "plainly brimming
with disputed issues of material fact" constituted a violation of Rule
11.81 The plaintiffs in SFM moved for summary judgment on seven of
eight counts8 2 when the memorandum submitted in opposition to the
defendants' Rule 11 motion8 3 conceded that factual issues were unresolved.8 4 The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that even if its

motion could not reasonably support judgment in its favor on any

75. Id. at 1521. The plaintiff sought damages for its own breach of a collective
bargaining agreement pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982). The court held that this situation was outside the scope
of the statute and described the plaintiff's characterization of the statute as "totally
baseless." 582 F. Supp. at 1521.
76. 582 F. Supp. at 1521. The issues raised concerning the defendant Operating
Engineers Local Union No. 3 ("Local 3") were precluded by a previous decision issued by an Administrative Law Judge, affirmed by the NLRB, and enforced by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 1520-21.
77. Id. at 1521. Concerning the claims against Local 3, the plaintiff cited no authority to support its charge that a union owes a duty to the employer to question the
ostensible collective bargaining authority of an employers' association.
78. Id. The court held that even assuming the complaint stated a federal claim
against the Landscape Contractors Council, the state law claim against Local 3 was
outside the court's jurisdiction because the Ninth Circuit had repeatedly held that
pendent party jurisdiction is not a substitute for complete diversity or a federal question. Id.
79. Id. at 1522. The Ninth Circuit subsequently affirmed this finding on appeal.
Huettig & Schromm, Inc. v. Landscape Contractors Council, 790 F.2d 1421, 1426-27
(9th Cir. 1986).
80. 102 F.R.D. 555 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
81. Id. at 556.
82. Id.

83. Frequently, courts invite the party opposing a Rule 11 motion to file a memorandum explaining why its view of the law has a reasonable basis. See Golden Eagle
Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
84. 102 F.R.D. at 557.
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claim, it was nonetheless reasonable under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d)8 5 for the purpose of allowing the court to determine what
factual issues remained in controversy.8 6 The court dismissed that
contention as a "post hoc rationalization" 87 clearly precluded by a
number of published opinions interpreting Rule 56.88
One district court has construed Rule 11 to impose upon attorneys filing papers with the court an obligation of candor in arguing
and citing the law. In Golden Eagle DistributingCorp. v. Burroughs
Corp.,89 the court imposed Rule 11 sanctions on the defense counsel

for presenting an argument for the extension of existing law as if it

were an argument warranted by existing law. 90 The court also concluded that the defense counsel's failure to cite adverse authority justified the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. 91

The plaintiff in Golden Eagle filed a state law claim in Minnesota

92
against the manufacturer of an allegedly defective computer system.
The defendant removed the case to federal court and obtained a transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) 93 to the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California.94 Subsequently, the defendant

85. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(d) provides as follows:
Case notfully adjudicatedon motion. If on motion under this rule, judgment
is not rendered upon the whole case or for all relief asked and a trial is
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings
and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable
ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what
material facts are actually in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon
make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is
not in controversy and directing such further proceedings in the action as
are just. Upon the trial of the action, the facts so specified shall be deemed
established and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
Id.; see also ALASKA R. Civ. P. 56(d) (language identical to federal rule).
86. SFM, 102 F.R.D. at 558.
87. Id. at 558 n.2. ("SFM is really indulging in a post hoc rationalization not
even whispered at in the course of its elaborate and extended presentation on the
original summary judgment motion.").
88. Id. at 558 (implying that plaintiff's counsel failed to make a reasonable inquiry because he should have known this argument was untenable).
89. 103 F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1984); see also Schwarzer, supra note 18, at 193-95
(discussion of attorney's duty of candor in stating the controlling law).
90. 103 F.R.D. at 126.
91. Id. at 127-28.
92. Id. at 125.
93. "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, and in the interest ofjustice, a
district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it
might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982).
94. 103 F.R.D. at 125.
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moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the statute of limitations barred the claims 95 or, alternatively, that California precedent
96
barred the claim for economic loss due to negligent manufacture.
On the statute of limitations issue, counsel for the defendants argued that a Minnesota state court would have dismissed the action
under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.97 Counsel asserted that
the case fit "squarely within" an "exception" noted by the Supreme
Court in Van Dusen v. Barrack,98 which "stated specifically that the
original [forum] state's law would not necessarily apply 'if it was contended that the transferor State would simply have dismissed the action on the ground of forum non conveniens.' 99
The Golden Eagle court characterized this argument as one "calculated to lead the Court to believe that it was warranted by existing
law" but which actually required an extension of existing law. 100 The
court reached this conclusion on the basis of the memorandum of defendant's counsel explaining why Rule 11 sanctions should not be imposed.101 That memorandum argued that, although the Minnesota
courts had not clearly addressed the issue of whether a state court
should refuse to dismiss a case under the doctrine of forum non conveniens solely because the claim would be time barred if filed in other
jurisdictions, there had been no cases in which a Minnesota court had
refused to dismiss for this reason. 10 2 Therefore, the Rule 11 memorandum concluded that it was plausible that a Minnesota court would
have dismissed this complaint. 0 3 On the corresponding point of federal law, the Rule 11 memorandum filed by defendant's counsel conceded that no controlling precedent existed on this issue and that in
the Van Dusen opinion the Supreme Court had reserved this issue as
an "open question."' 0 4 The memorandum concluded with the assertion that the motion was based on a plausible view of the proper
05
choice-of-law rule to be applied in the case.'
Defendant's Rule 11 memorandum was described as an "excellent defense of their position" that articulated their argument with
"exemplary clarity and fairness."' 1 6 The court held, however, that to
95.
96.
97.
98,

Id.
Id.
Id. at 126.
376 U.S. 612 (1964).

99. Golden Eagle, 103 F.R.D. at 127 (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S.
612, 640 (1964)).
100. Id. at 126.
101. Id. at 126-27.
102. Id. at 126.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 127.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 125-26.
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comply with Rule 11 the defendant's counsel should have presented
his Rule 11 memorandum instead of his original argument when filing
the motion for summary judgment. 10 7 In effect, the court interpreted
Rule 11 to require that counsel certify that his filing is warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law, and that the argument is presented so that
the court can readily determine whether it is based upon existing law
or an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.
The Golden Eagle court found that sanctions were also appropriate in light of the failure of defendant's counsel to cite adverse author10 8
ity on the issue of damages for economic loss due to negligence.
The counsel for the defendant had cited a 1965 California Supreme
Court case, Seely v. White Motor Co., '0 9 that barred recovery in negligence actions alleging only economic loss. 110 Counsel did not cite a
1979 California Supreme Court decision, J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory,"'
that "inexplicably" neglected to cite Seely, but held that purely economic loss was recoverable in a negligence action where a special relationship existed between the parties. 112 Additionally, the defendant's
counsel failed to cite two recent California appellate decisions, both of
which discussed Seely and J'Aire and applied the latter to the issue of
11 3
economic loss.
In reply to the plaintiff's brief in opposition to the defendant's
summary judgment motion, counsel for the defendant asserted that
Seely "has never been overruled."' 1 4 The Golden Eagle court held
that assertion to be misleading in light of the two intermediate appellate decisions. In response to counsel's claim that he was "unaware
of" those two decisions, the court noted counsel's "demonstrated capacity to find obscure precedent." 11 5 The court then held that the attorney had not made a reasonable effort to determine existing law on
107. Id.

108. Id. at 129.
109. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
110. 103 F.R.D. at 128.
111. 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979).
112. 103 F.R.D. at 128 (quotingJ'AireCorp., 24 Cal. 3d at 804, 598 P.2d at 64, 157
Cal. Rptr. at 410).
113. Golden Eagle, 103 F.R.D. at 129 (citing Huang v. Garner, 157 Cal. App. 3d
404, 203 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1984); Pisano v. American Leasing, 146 Cal. App. 3d 194,
194 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1983)).
114. Golden Eagle, 103 F.R.D. at 129.
115. Id. The court noted, "Counsel's declaration does not specify what search was
made here, but their Rule 11 memorandum bespeaks their capacity to find supporting
authority, such as the Lexis copy of an unreported district court decision .. ."Id.
The court's reference to counsel's access to research resources indicates that the resources available to an attorney may be an appropriate factor to consider in determining what constitutes a reasonable inquiry under the circumstances. Cf Heuttig &
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the economic loss issue. 1 6 The court concluded that failure to cite
adverse authority constitutes a Rule 11 violation if that deficiency is
due to a failure to make a reasonable inquiry into the law." 17
IV.
THE RELEVANCE OF AN ATTORNEY'S PURPOSE IN FILING
PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, OR OTHER PAPERS UNDER RULE 11.

Under pre-1983 federal Rule 11, an attorney certified that his
pleading was "not interposed for delay."' 1 18 The amended federal Rule
11 requires a signing attorney or party to certify that his pleading,
motion, or other paper "is not interposed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in
the cost of litigation."'1 9 The notes of the advisory committee indicate
that the broader language of the amended rule "recognizes that the
20
litigation process may be abused for purposes other than delay."'
Although the notes of the advisory committee do not explicitly define
the test of improper purpose as an objective standard of reasonableness, 12 1 such a standard is consistent with the purpose of amended
Rule 11.122
A more interesting question is whether a filing that does not violate Rule 1l's standard of reasonable inquiry into fact and law may
Schromm v. Landscaping Council, 582 F. Supp. 1519, 1522 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (experience of firm cited as a factor in determining sanctions), aff'd, 790 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir.
1986).
116. 103 F.R.D. at 129.
117. See id. ("For counsel to have been unaware of those cases means that they
did not Shepardize their principal authority .... ." Failure to "Shepardize" cases
relied upon seems to be almost unreasonable per se.).
118. FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C. (1982); see ALASKA R. Civ. P. 11 (same language as pre-1983 federal Rule 11).
119. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
120. FED. R. CIv. P. 11 advisory committee's notes.
121. The advisory committee's notes do not refer to the improper purpose prong of
the rule beyond the statement that "[tihe expanded nature of the lawyer's certification
in the fifth sentence of Rule 11 recognizes that the litigation process may be abused for
purposes other than delay." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes.
122. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes (indicating the need to
avoid satellite litigation in the imposition of sanctions under Rule 11); Schwarzer,
supra note 18, at 196 ("In considering whether a paper was interposed for an improper
purpose, the court need not delve into the attorney's subjective intent ....
Were a
court to entertain inquiries into subjective bad faith, it would invite a number of potentially harmful consequences."); WSB Electric Co. v. Rank and File Comm., 103
F.R.D. 417, 420-21 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (in dictum, discussing improper purpose under
Rule 11, court referred to the "apparent purpose" of the complaint, based upon the
nature of the underlying dispute and the burdensome effect of discovery under the
complex federal claims alleged).
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nevertheless violate Rule lI's requirement that the paper not be "interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause un123
necessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation."
Nothing in the language of Rule 11 or the notes of the advisory committee would preclude a court from finding that a pleading, motion, or
other paper, although based on a reasonable factual inquiry and colorable interpretation of existing law, had been filed for an improper purpose under Rule 11.124 In fact, in Cohen v. Virginia Electric & Power
Co., 125 the court reached this exact conclusion. The Cohen court upheld a sanction of attorney's fees imposed on an attorney for filing a
motion to amend his complaint with the purpose of withdrawing it if
the other party indicated any opposition.12 6 The court found that,
although there was a reasonable legal basis for the motion to amend,
the filing violated Rule 11 because the plaintiff and his attorney had
"filed a motion they had no intention of pursuing if it were
opposed." 127
V.

SANCTIONS

Amended Rule 11 allows the court to punish violations by imposing "an appropriate sanction" on the signer of the pleading, motion, or
other paper, a represented party, or both. 12 Several courts have interpreted the language "shall impose.., an appropriate sanction" 1 29 as a
123. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
124. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. This issue has arisen infrequently because almost every
federal Rule 11 case discussing the issue of improper purpose has also involved a
violation of the rule's requirement that papers not be filed without a reasonable inquiry into the facts and law. For example, in Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 1217 (1986), the court found no legal basis
for a damage action filed against a state judge for his ruling in a divorce proceeding,
and held that the complaint had been filed for the improper purpose of attempting to
compel the state judge to recuse himself in the pending divorce proceeding. In In re
Ronco, Inc., 105 F.R.D. 493, 498 (N.D. Ill. 1985), a federal district court cited improper purpose as an "aggravating factor" in the filing of a document request which
had no reasonable basis in law. The court in WSB Electric, 103 F.R.D. at 420, discussed the plaintiff attorney's improper purpose of harassment when they imposed
sanctions on him for filing a complaint lacking the factual and legal basis required
under Rule 11. Finally, the court in Hearld v. Barnes and Spectrum Emergency Care,
107 F.R.D. 17 (E.D. Tex. 1985), based its holding upon plaintiff's improper purpose
of preserving diversity jurisdiction while allowing nondiverse parties to maintain an
interest in litigation, but the court also assumed that a disclaimer of interest filed in
response to motion to dismiss was ineffective as a matter of law.
125. 788 F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 1986).
126. Id. at 249.
127. Id.
128. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
129. Id.
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mandatory directive to courts. 30 The court's discretion under the rule
to determine the type of sanctions and the person(s) to be sanctioned
preserves the court's ability to effect substantial justice. '3 ' Concerning
the imposition of sanctions against attorneys personally, the advisory
committee's notes state that the amendment to Rule 11 "should eliminate any doubt as to the propriety of assessing sanctions against the

attorney." 132
Perhaps the most significant change effected under the amendments to Rule 11 is reflected in the increasing frequency with which

courts have assessed monetary sanctions that include attorney's

fees.' 33 Rule 11 specifically provides that "an appropriate sanction

may include an order to pay the other party or parties the amount of
the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading,

motion or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.'

34

De-

spite the fact that the language is permissive, attorney's fees appear to
have become a standard sanction since the 1983 amendment of Rule
11.135
130. Albright v. Upjohn Co., 788 F.2d 1217, 1222 (6th Cir. 1986) ("Rule I1 expressly mandates the imposition of sanctions once a violation is found."); see Hearld v.
Barnes and Spectrum Emergency Care, 107 F.R.D. 17, 20 (E.D. Tex. 1985); Wold v.
Minerals Eng'g Co., 575 F. Supp. 166, 167 (1983) ("Rule 11 requires the Court, upon
finding a violation of this Rule, to impose upon the person who signed the paper, a
represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction .... "); FED. R. Civ. P. 11 ("If a
pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon
motion or upon its own initiative, shallimpose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction ....
")(emphasis added).
131. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes. The committee observes:
[T]he words "shall impose" . . . focus the court's attention on the need to
impose sanctions for pleading and motion abuses. The court, however, retains the necessary flexibility to deal appropriately with violations of the
rule. It has discretion to tailor sanctions to the particular facts of the case,
with which it should be well acquainted.
Id.

132. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes. But see Hot Locks, Inc. v.
Ooh La La, Inc., 107 F.R.D. 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (warning that the imposition of
sanctions undermines the atmosphere of friendly cooperation and collegiality between
attorneys).
133. See generally Strasser, Sanctions: A Sword Is Sharpened?, NAT'L L.J., Nov.

11, 1985, at 1, col. 3; Kassin, supra note 21, at 6 (citing 65 cases in which attorney's
fees were awarded as a sanction for a violation of Rule 11). In addition to attorney's
fees, some courts have imposed fines pursuant to Rule 11. See Cheek v. Doe, 110
F.R.D. 420 (N.D. Il.1986); Dyson v. Sposeep, 637 F. Supp. 616 (N.D. Ind. 1986).
134. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (emphasis added).
135. See, e.g., Orange Prod. Credit v. Frontline Ventures, Ltd., 792 F.2d 797 (9th
Cir. 1986) (sanction of over $50,000 in attorney's fees imposed by United States District Court for the District of Alaska upheld on appeal); Cannon v. Loyola Univ., 784
F.2d 777 (7th Cir. 1986) (affirming district court's assessment of attorney's fees for
filing of a complaint barred by resjudicata); United States v. Carley, 783 F.2d 341 (2d
Cir.) (award of attorney's fees by district court upheld on appeal), cert. denied, - U.S.
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A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE AND A RECOMMENDATION
FOR ALASKA

Courts, commentators, and even the Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules have pointed out several potential drawbacks to Rule
11. These potential drawbacks should not, however, dissuade Alaska
from adopting amended Rule 11. As the discussion below indicates,
Alaska can achieve efficiency benefits by amending Alaska Rule 11,
and can minimize the potential for negative effects through the careful
exercise of judicial discretion.
Commentators have criticized Rule 11 on the ground that it undermines the attorney-client relationship. 136 According to these critics, issues of attorney-client privilege and work product confidentiality
will arise in Rule 11 proceedings that focus on the reasonableness of
the attorney's inquiry into the facts and law.' 37 The 1983 Notes of the
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules refute this view:
The rule does not require a party or an attorney to disclose privileged communications or work product in order to show that the
signing of the pleading, motion or other paper is substantially
justified.138

As the Advisory Committee notes suggest, discovery rules and in
camera inspection by the court can usually remedy any problems associated with Rule 11.139 In most cases, client communications relevant
to whether a paper is well-founded will eventually be disclosed outside
of the Rule 11 proceedings, either in a pleading or during discovery. 14
Where such is not the case and protection is required, the option of in
camera inspection exists.' 4 ' The paucity of litigation in the federal
courts over this issue indicates that, under the objective standard of
-, 106 S. Ct. 2251 (1986); Thornton v. Wahl, 787 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir. 1986) (imposing double costs and attorney's fees for filing of an appeal based upon a "serious misstatement of state law").
136. See, e.g., Harvey, A Judicial Assault on the Attorney-Client Relationship:
Thoughts on the 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1
BENCHMARKS

17 (1984); Marcus, Reducing Court Costs and Delay, 66

JUDICATURE

363 (1983); Note, ReasonableInquiry under Rule 11 - Is the Stop, Look, and Investigate Requirement a Litigant'sRoadblock?, 18 IND. L. REv. 751 (1985).
137. See Marcus, supra note 136, at 365 (arguing that since confidential attorneyclient communications and attorney work product will usually be the sole source of
information on the question of compliance with Rule 11, these will inevitably be disclosed despite the advisory committee's notes to the contrary).
138. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes.
139. Id. The committee notes observe, "The provisions of Rule 26(c), including
appropriate orders after in camera inspection by the court, remain available to protect
a party claiming privilege or work product protection."
140. Schwarzer, supra note 18, at 199.
141. Id. (suggesting that an in camera inspection should be an exception rather
than the rule in order to avoid "the implication of an ex parte communication on the
merits").
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reasonableness embodied in Rule 11, attorney-client communications
and attorney work product will seldom become an issue in Rule 11
proceedings. Alaska courts could effectively prevent proposed Alaska
Rule 11 from invading the attorney-client relationship by applying the
objective standard of federal Rule 11 and following appropriate in
camera inspection procedures when an apparent confidential communication or work product issue arises.
Another criticism leveled at Rule 11 is that its implementation

will bar some litigants from access to the courts. 142 This criticism is
rooted in the belief that plaintiffs will forego filing a claim - especially
when they are unsure of success or are advancing a novel legal argument 143 - for fear of incurring sanctions under Rule 11.144 This criticism is partially addressed in the 1983 Notes of the Advisory

Committee concerning pro se litigants, which admonish the federal
courts to exercise discretion in assessing violations or awarding sanctions.14 5 Alaska courts could further safeguard litigants' access to judicial relief by assessing the reasonableness of a plaintiff's inquiry into
the facts and law without the benefit of hindsight, 146 and by exercising
discretion not to assess a violation or impose sanctions in situations
where the plaintiff lacks access to crucial factual information. 147
142. Note, supra note 136, at 773-74.
143. See infra text accompanying notes 157-66 (suggesting the precautions Alaska
courts could observe to prevent proposed Alaska Rule 11 from exercising a "chilling
effect" on novel and creative legal argument).
144. Note, supra note 136, at 773.
145. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes:
Although the standard is the same for unrepresented parties, who are
obliged themselves to sign the pleadings, the court has sufficient discretion to
take account of the special circumstances that often arise in pro se situations
... [and] ... in considering the nature and severity of the sanctions to be
imposed, the court should take account of the state of the attorney's or
party's actual or presumed knowledge when the pleading or other paper was
signed. Thus, for example, when a party is not represented by counsel, the
absence of legal advice is an appropriate factor to be considered.
146. See id. ("The court is expected to avoid using the wisdom of hindsight and
should test the signer's conduct by inquiring what was reasonable to believe at the
time the pleading, motion, or other paper was submitted."); Thomas v. Capital Sec.
Serv., 110 F.R.D. 402 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (court found sanctions under Rule l1 inappropriate because at time of filing of complaint some cases relied upon by court in
granting defendant's summary judgment motion had not been decided); Hot Locks,
Inc.'v. Ooh La La, Inc., 107 F.R.D. 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (although court granted
defendant's motion to dismiss patent, trademark, and copyright claims, it held that
plaintiff did not violate Rule 11 because when forum was selected plaintiff did not
know venue was improper).
147. See Kamen v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1986) (discussed supra at notes 43-47 and accompanying text).
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It should also be recognized that the pervasive application of
Rule 11 would actually increase effective access to the courts for litigants. Current Rule 11 applies to all pleadings, motions, and papers
filed by any party in a dispute. 14 8 Consequently, it preserves the right
of access to legal process of litigants whose claims otherwise might be
frustrated by their adversary's filing of frivolous motions or other papers interposed for delay, harassment, or needless increase in the cost
of litigation. A recent study of reported Rule 11 decisions indicates
that sanctions have been imposed equally on plaintiffs and defendants. 149 This study supports the conclusion that Rule 11 preserves a
litigant's access to the courts as much as it defeats that access.
The most significant criticism of Rule 11 is that its application
discourages vigorous advocacy and exerts a "chilling effect" on creative legal arguments. 150 The Advisory Committee on the Federal
Rules expressly stated that Rule 11 "is not intended to chill an attor151
ney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories,"
thus implicitly recognizing the rule's potential chilling effect. This potential chilling effect on enthusiastic and creative advocacy represents
the most serious deficiency in amended Rule 11.152
The Supreme Court of Alaska and its advisory committee on
Alaska Rule 11 must recognize that two provisions in federal Rule 11
contribute to Rule Il's potential chilling effect. First, the "any improper purpose" prong of Rule 11 may discourage enthusiastic and
vigorous advocacy. 153 Under that language, an attorney who has conducted a reasonable factual inquiry, has a reasonable basis in law for
his pleading, motion, or other paper, and has no purpose of delay,
148. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
149. Study by Second Circuit Committee on Pretrial Phase of Civil Litigation,
headed by Professor M. Rosenberg, cited in 8 NAT'L L.J., Nov. 11, 1985 at 32, col. 2.
150. Marcus, supra note 136, at 365; Note, supra note 136, at 765.
151. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes.
152. It is the most serious potential drawback because the effects - pleadings,
motions, or papers never filed or arguments never made - are virtually imperceptible
and unmeasurable, yet they would inflict pervasive and lasting damage to all areas of
the law.
153. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Although it might be argued that imposing any obligation on an attorney necessarily reduces the vigor of his advocacy on his client's behalf,
Judge Schwarzer adequately rebuts that contention in the following passage:
The lawyer's duty to place his client's interest ahead of all others presupposes that the lawyer will live with the rules that govern the system. Unlike
the polemicist haranguing the public from his soapbox in the park, the lawyer enjoys the privilege of a professional license that entitles him to entry
into the justice system to represent his client and, in doing so, to pursue his
profession and earn his living. He is subject to the correlative obligation to
comply with the rules and to conduct himself in a manner consistent with
the proper functioning of that system.
Schwarzer, supra note 18, at 184.
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harassment, or needless increase in the cost of litigation, may still violate Rule 11.154 In other words, if an attorney can be sanctioned under

Rule 11 for filing an otherwise reasonable paper simply on the basis of
a purpose determined to be improper by the court without citation of
any authority,1 55 he will not be able to pursue his client's interests to
the fullest extent allowed by the applicable law and underlying facts.
The chilling factor in this situation is the potential for the imposition
of sanctions under Rule 11 based upon a purpose that the attorney

could not anticipate as "improper."
If the Alaska Supreme Court adopts proposed Alaska Rule 11, it
could substantially eliminate this problem in either of two ways. It
could alter the language in order to limit the definition of improper

purpose
to harassment, unnecessary delay, or needless increase in
156
cost.
Alternatively, the court could impose a judicial gloss on the
interpretation of the language "any improper purpose" to limit the
interpretation to purposes expressly contrary to the statutory or com-

mon law of Alaska. Either approach would afford Alaska attorneys a
basis for determining whether their conduct conformed to Alaska's

amended rule 11, and would, therefore, substantially eliminate the
chilling effect on vigorous and enthusiastic advocacy caused by the

spectre of unanticipated judicial pronouncements of improper
purpose.
Second, the "well grounded in fact, and warranted by existing law
or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of
existing law" provision may, if improperly applied, chill creative and
novel legal argument. 157 This provision should not, however, be
154. See Cohen v. Virginia Electric and Power Co., 788 F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 1986)
(discussed supra text accompanying notes 125-27).
155. This was exactly the context in Cohen. Id. at 249. The Cohen court cited no
authority for the holding that it was improper to file a motion with the intent to
withdraw it if opposed. Although the court reasoned that the plaintiff could have
simply contacted the defendant to inquire if he intended to oppose the motion, this
possibility does not necessarily render the filing of a motion "improper." Moreover,
the court's holding will not necessarily encourage informal contact between parties in
the future, because in a subsequent case the attorney could avoid sanctions merely by
declining to withdraw the motion.
156. The court could achieve this result by deleting this bracketed portion of the
fifth sentence of the amended rule: "and that it is not interposed [for any improper
purpose, such as] to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the
cost of litigation." FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
157. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Chilling creative and novel legal argument is of special
concern in Alaska due to the lack of controlling precedent in many areas of the law.
Alaska attorneys often must argue by analogy to other doctrines or use the law in
other jurisdictions.
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amended or deleted. Instead, Alaska courts must exercise their discretion not to impose sanctions when such action would retard the development of the law by chilling creative legal argument, either in the
case at hand or on a systemic basis. 158 Guidance can be found in several Rule 11 cases where courts have given due regard to the danger of
Rule I l's potential chilling effect. 1 59 Where an attorney advances a
novel, yet unsuccessful, legal argument creatively, enthusiastically,

and in good faith, an Alaska court should exercise its discretion to

refrain from invoking proposed Alaska Rule 11.160
Furthermore, Alaska courts should not interpret proposed
Alaska Rule 11 as a means of imposing on the signing attorney a
judge's personal notions concerning the construction of legal argument. An analysis of the approach adopted in Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp.161 demonstrates the danger of using Rule
11 to require an attorney to conform to a standard of advocacy that
the text of the rule does not support. In that case, the court interpreted the Rule as prohibiting a signing attorney from presenting arguments warranted by an extension of existing law in a manner
158. "Today's frivolity may be tomorrow's law, and the law often grows by an
organic process in which a concept is conceived, then derided as absurd [and clearly
not the law], then accepted as theoretically tenable [though not the law], then accepted as the law." Risinger, supra note 8, at 57.
159. For example, in Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1180 (D.C. Cir.
1985), the court limited the award of attorney's fees under Rule 11 to the amount
incurred in the defense of the civil contempt issue, excluding fees incurred in litigating
the properly contested issue of whether defendant could in fact videotape the deposition. In In re TCI, Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 447-48 (7th Cir. 1985), the court concluded
that the case involved no chilling effect on the law because it was tried before a bankruptcy court, which cannot change the interpretation of the law, but only applies it.
Finally, in Heuttig & Schromm, Inc. v. Landscape Contractors Council, 582 F. Supp.
1519, 1522 (N.D. Cal. 1984), aff'd, 790 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1986), the court noted
that counsel's conduct in this case could not be attributed to enthusiastic or creative
advocacy of his client's cause, and therefore it imposed Rule 11 sanctions.
160. Nelson v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 750 F.2d 1234 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 2358 (1985), provides an example of such an application
of Rule 11. The plaintiff's attorney in Nelson argued that the definition of "employee"
in the Federal Railway Labor Act included an airline pilot. The attorney relied on an
argument by analogy to anti-discrimination provisions in other federal labor laws. Id.
at 1238. The court noted that the attorney had not cited anything in the language or
legislative history of the statute nor had he cited any case interpreting the term "employee" so expansively. Id. at 1235. Nevertheless, the court upheld the district
court's refusal to find a violation of Rule 11 because it could not "say [that] the analogies were drawn with no 'good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law.'"
161. 103 F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (discussed supra notes 89-117 and accompanying text).
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"calculated to lead the court to believe that it was 'warranted by existing law.'

"162

In other words, the court read into Rule 11 a duty to

clearly identify and separate legal arguments into the two categories

- existing law and the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law - stated in the Rule. 163 This approach is impracticable because

not all legal arguments can be so easily labeled, especially those on

complex and novel issues. 64 The Golden Eagle interpretation of Rule
11 significantly departs from accepted notions of advocacy by informing a signing attorney that he should structure his argument to minimize its departure from established authority. 65 Moreover, this
conception of the Rule prevents an attorney from pressing his client's

case vigorously, as it eliminates the distinction between an objective
memorandum written for in-house use, and an argumentative brief
166
filed with the court.
VII. CONCLUSION
As the preceding discussion of federal Rule 11 cases illustrates,
Alaska can avoid the potential negative effects of amended Rule 11
through the exercise of judicial discretion. The Supreme Court of

Alaska should adopt federal Rule 11 in order to deter the filing of
162. Golden Eagle, 103 F.R.D. at 126. This portion of Golden Eagle is discussed
supra notes 97-107.
163. Golden Eagle, 103 F.R.D. at 126. The language of the rule itself does not
require categorization of legal argument into these categories; it merely provides that
the argument be "warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law". FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (emphasis added).
The Golden Eagle court interpreted Rule 11 as if it included a provision to this effect:
"The signature of an attorney or party certifies that the legal position advanced is
clearly and accurately labelled as one of the following: based on existing law or based
on a good faith argument for extension, modification or reversal of existing law."
164. Furthermore, members of the bench and bar often couch argument supporting change in terms that minimize or disregard the extent to which the resulting
change will depart from existing practice. Cf MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217
N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). MacPherson extended a manufacturer's liability for
defective goods beyond injured parties in privity of contract with the manufacturer.
Id. Although the dissent characterized the holding as extending a manufacturer's liability "further than any case which has yet received the sanction of this court," id. at
396, 111 N.E. at 1055, Judge Cardozo's majority opinion minimized the departure
from prior law emphasizing that the principle of liability governing inherently dangerous products controlled the outcome of the case. See id. at 385, 111 N.E. at 1051.
165. Cf MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 comment (1983)
("A lawyer is not required to make a disinterested exposition of the law ....");
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-23 (1980) ("The adversary
system contemplates that each lawyer will present and argue the existing law in the
light most favorable to his client.").
166. See Golden Eagle, 103 F.R.D. at 125-26 (suggesting that a Rule 11 issue
would not have arisen if defendant's counsel had filed his Rule 11 memorandum as his
brief).
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frivolous pleadings, motions, or other papers. To the extent that
Alaska can curtail frivolous and abusive practices through the adoption of amended Rule 11, it can devote the state's judicial resources to
the resolution of non-frivolous issues in pending cases.
W. Joseph Thesing, Jr.

